How to detect a salami slicer: a stochastic controller-stopper game with
  unknown competition by Ekström, Erik et al.
How to detect a salami slicer: a stochastic controller-stopper
game with unknown competition
Erik Ekstro¨m
Department of Mathematics, Uppsala University
Kristoffer Lindensjo¨
Department of Mathematics, Stockholm University
Marcus Olofsson
Department of Mathematics, Uppsala University
October 9, 2020
Abstract
We consider a stochastic game of control and stopping specified in terms of a process
Xt = −θΛt + Wt, representing the holdings of Player 1, where W is a Brownian motion, θ
is a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether Player 2 is active or not, and Λ is a non-
decreasing process representing the accumulated “theft” or “fraud” performed by Player 2
(if active) against Player 1. Player 1 cannot observe θ or Λ directly, but can merely observe
the path of the process X and may choose a stopping rule τ to deactivate Player 2 at a cost
M . Player 1 thus does not know if she is the victim of fraud and operates in this sense under
unknown competition. Player 2 can observe both θ and W and seeks to choose the fraud
strategy Λ that maximizes the expected discounted amount
E
[
θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsdΛs
]
,
whereas Player 1 seeks to choose the stopping strategy τ so as to minimize the expected
discounted cost
E
[
θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsdΛs + e−rτMI{τ<∞}
]
.
This non-zero-sum game appears to be novel and is motivated by applications in fraud
detection; it combines filtering (detection), non-singular control, stopping, strategic features
(games) and asymmetric information. We derive Nash equilibria for this game; for some
parameter values we find an equilibrium in pure strategies, and for other parameter values
we find an equilibrium by allowing for randomized stopping strategies.
1 Introduction
“Salami slicing” is a well known concept of fraud, where a thief or a fraudster repeatedly steals
small amounts - so small that the net loss from the system is hard to detect at each instant. Albeit
a small intensity of theft, aggregated over time or over a large number of victims, the accumulated
amount stolen may become large if not detected in time. The essence of a salami slicing strategy
is thus to trade-off between maximizing short-time profits and avoiding detection. Classical
examples include penny shaving, i.e., consistently rounding off a large number of transactions
up to the nearest penny and stealing the difference (cf. [23]), modifying the fuel tank capacity of
rental cars so that customers pay for slightly more fuel than they consume at each rental (see [5]),
and stealing one coin from each fare box of a public transportation agency (see [20]). Further
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examples in the same spirit can easily be thought of in the context of, e.g., poaching of game
or fish (where the poacher would trade-off between an offensive strategy and being detected), a
spy who steals classified information (again, a balance between exploitation and detection is a
natural ingredient), computer networks with possible information leakage or botnet defense (cf.
[9, Sec. 7.1.10] and [29] where mean field games of botnet defense are studied). Yet another
related example is in the context of online privacy issues, where individuals knowingly give away
small pieces of information about themselves, but would refuse to do so if they knew that this
information was fully exploited against them.
An essential ingredient in a salami slicing strategy is the possibility to avoid detection by the
presence of natural stochastic fluctuations in the underlying system; an observed fluctuation may
then be due to such stochasticity, or stem from a fraudster being active (or from a combination of
both). In this paper, we model the natural fluctuations by a Brownian motion and assume that
the account holder, i.e., the possible victim and fraud detector, can only observe the total effect
of natural fluctuations and the accumulated theft. Moreover, we equip the account holder with
the possibility to deactivate the potential fraudster at any time at a given cost M . As discussed
above, there is then a natural trade-off for the fraudster between stealing large amounts and
being detected. From the perspective of fraud detection on the other hand, the account holder
has to balance the losses of potential fraud against the cost of deactivation.
1.1 Mathematical problem formulation
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space on which a standard Brownian motion W = (Wt)t≥0 and
an independent Bernoulli random variable θ with P(θ = 1) = p = 1− P(θ = 0) are given, where
p ∈ (0, 1). We consider a two-player stochastic game in which the players are referred to as
“account holder” (Player 1) and “fraudster” (Player 2). Let the stochastic process X = (Xt)t≥0
be given by
Xt = −θΛt +Wt,
where Λ = (Λt)t≥0 is a non-decreasing stochastic process chosen by the fraudster. The interpre-
tation is that X represents the wealth of the account holder, θ is an indicator of whether the
fraudster is active (θ = 1) or not (θ = 0), p represents the account holder’s initial belief that
the fraudster is active, and Λ corresponds to the accumulated amount stolen by the fraudster
(if active).
We assume that the strategy Λ of the fraudster is FW,θ-adapted, where FW,θ = (FW,θt )t≥0 is
the augmented filtration generated by W and θ. The interpretation is that the fraudster knows
whether he is active or not, as well as observes the natural fluctuations, i.e., W , in the account,
and based on this information decides how to steal.
The account holder, on the other hand, is assumed not to have direct access to the underlying
Brownian motion W , but can merely observe the path of the aggregate process X. The account
holder is equipped with a stopping control as follows: at any time, she may choose to deactivate
the fraudster by paying a fixed amount M > 0, thereby ruling out the possibility for an active
fraudster to continue stealing. The control of the account holder is thus represented by a random
time. In Sections 1-3, the account holder strategy will be chosen from the class of stopping times
with respect to FX = (FXt )t≥0, which is the augmented filtration generated by X. Then, in
Section 4, we will also consider randomized stopping times.
Definition 1. A continuous FW,θ-adapted non-decreasing process Λ with Λ0 = 0 is said to be
a fraud strategy and an FX-stopping time τ is said to be a stopping strategy. The set of fraud
strategies is denoted by L, and the set of FX-stopping times is denoted by T. Given a pair
(τ,Λ) ∈ T× L, the expected cost for the account holder is defined as
J 1(τ,Λ; p) = E
[
θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsdΛs + e−rτMI{τ<∞}
]
, (1)
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and the expected payoff for the fraudster is defined as
J 2(τ,Λ; p) = E
[
θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsdΛs
]
, (2)
where the discount rate r is a positive constant.
Remark 2. For admissibility, we require that the fraud strategy Λ is continuous. An alternative
specification would allow for strategies that are merely right-continuous with left limits, where
then additional care in the definition of J 1 and J 2 in the case of a lump sum payment and
simultaneous stopping is needed. For example, replacing the upper limit of integration in (1) and
(2) by τ− would correspond to a specification giving precedence to the stopper. However, since
a jump in X would immediately reveal the existence of the fraudster, it is (at least heuristically)
clear that the account holder would stop at the first jump time, thereby reducing that set-up to
the present case with only continuous fraud strategies.
In the above set-up the account holder naturally seeks to choose a strategy τ to minimize
the cost (1), whereas the fraudster seeks to choose a strategy Λ to maximize (2), and we define
a Nash equilibrium accordingly.
Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium). A pair of strategies (τ∗,Λ∗) ∈ T × L is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) if it satisfies { J 1(τ∗,Λ∗; p) ≤ J 1(τ,Λ∗; p)
J 2(τ∗,Λ∗; p) ≥ J 2(τ∗,Λ; p) (3)
for any pair (τ,Λ) ∈ T× L.
Remark 4. We have equipped the fraudster with the filtration FW,θ so that any fraudster strategy
is on the form Λ = Λ01{θ=0} + Λ11{θ=1} for non-decreasing FW -adapted processes Λ0 and Λ1.
However, since neither J 1 nor J 2 depends on Λ0, but only on Λ1, the specification of Λ0 is
superfluous. In fact, a game which is strategically equivalent to the one introduced is obtained if
J 2 is replaced with
Jˆ 2(τ,Λ; p) := E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsdΛs
∣∣∣∣ θ = 1] .
The functionals J 2 and Jˆ 2 have the following interpretations. Imagine that before the game
starts, i.e., at time t = 0−, neither player knows θ, and that the value of θ will be revealed
to Player 2 at t = 0. J 2 is then the expected payoff for Player 2 at time 0−, whereas Jˆ 2 is
the expected payoff at time 0 in case θ = 1. These games are referred to as the ex ante game
and the interim version of the game, respectively (see [1, 18] for classical theory of games under
incomplete information). Also note that J 2(τ,Λ; p) = pJˆ 2(τ,Λ; p) and that, in the definition of
a NE, the second inequality in (3) can be replaced by Jˆ 2(τ∗,Λ∗; p) ≥ Jˆ 2(τ∗,Λ; p).
Remark 5. An essential feature of our game is that the account holder cannot observe the
strategy Λ used by the fraudster, but can only observe the path of the aggregate process X. Our
setup and terminology thus differs from that of, e.g., [7] and [35], where a strategy is a map
from the set of controls of one player to the set of controls of the other player.
In Section 3 we determine a Nash equilibrium for the above game in case M ≤
√
pi
2
√
r
, see
Theorem 13. Then, in Section 4, a Nash equilibrium is obtained also for M >
√
pi
2
√
r
by allowing
for randomized stopping strategies, see Theorem 21.
1.2 Literature review
While the present problem belongs to a new class of stochastic games — the novel feature being
the presence of unknown competition, or a “ghost” (cf. the below) — it does belong in a wider
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sense to the literature on combined stochastic control and stopping games and to the literature
on stochastic games under asymmetric information. Without aspiring to completeness, we give
a brief review of such related papers.
The controller-and-stopper game was introduced as a zero-sum game in discrete time in
[32]. In the seminal study [27], the zero-sum controller-and-stopper game is studied in a one-
dimensional diffusion setting. In [21] a zero-sum game between a stopper and a singular controller
of a one-dimensional diffusion is studied and, depending on which of the controller and the
stopper has the first-move advantage, two different solutions are obtained (cf. Remark 2 above).
A similar game is considered in [22] in a model based on a spectrally one-sided Le´vy process.
Further literature on zero-sum controller-and-stopper games include [2, 4, 10, 28, 34], whereas
[6, 25] study non-zero-sum versions.
The first study of a stochastic differential game under asymmetric information is [7] (see also
[8]). In particular, in [7] a zero-sum stochastic differential game under asymmetric information
where two players control a multi-dimensional diffusion is studied. It is shown that the game has
a value, which is the solution in a dual sense to an associated Hamilton-Jacobi equation. In [15],
a continuous time zero-sum game where one player observes a Brownian motion, and one does
not, is studied using an approach which relies on an approximating sequence of corresponding
discrete time games. Numerical approximation for stochastic differential games with asymmetric
information is studied in [3] and [16]. Another strand of this literature studies stopping games
under asymmetric information, see, e.g., [12, 13, 14, 17, 30].
A key feature of the problem studied in this paper is the presence of unknown competition
in the sense that Player 2 — the fraudster — may be non-existent (inactive), effectively leaving
the unknowing Player 1 — the account holder — playing a game against a “ghost”. In contrast
to [7], where the players can observe the realization of the other player’s control, it is essential
in our set-up that the actions of the fraudster are not directly observable by the account holder
(if they were, the account holder would detect the fraudster as soon as the control is non-zero).
It appears that this is the first study of a stochastic game with unknown competition and a
continuously controllable state process — the only other paper to consider dynamic stochastic
games under unknown competition is, according to our knowledge, [11], in which a Dynkin
(stopping) game is studied and where the term “ghost” is introduced. In particular, in [11] the
effect of unknown competition in a Dynkin game is studied in a setting where each of the two
players is uncertain whether the other player exists or not; using methods from filtering theory
it is shown that a key feature of the equilibrium solution to that problem is that randomized
stopping strategies should be used in such a way that the other player’s adjusted belief process,
i.e., the conditional probability of active competition, stays below a certain boundary. For
related studies within the economics literature see [19] and [33], where auctions with unknown
competition in a non-dynamic setting are studied.
Admittingly, the current set-up models a rather stylized version of fraud detection, and nat-
urally has its limitations from an applied perspective. For example, the set-up of a fraudster
that is either active or inactive may seem unrealistically static, and one could allow for a more
dynamic presence of, possibly, several fraudsters. Also, the account holdings are assumed unlim-
ited so that the analysis below becomes independent of the present value of X, whereas limited
resources would be a natural ingredient in many applications. Moreover, the set of possible ac-
tions (stop or not stop) of the account holder is rather scarce; applications in resource extraction
would call for a continuous action space also for her. It is our hope that the methods developed
in the present paper will facilitate and encourage further research into dynamic stochastic games
under unknown competition.
2 Applications of filtering theory
The Nash equilibria we identify below are specified in terms of the conditional probability the
account holder assigns to the event {θ = 1} that the fraudster is active, and we therefore require
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some elements of filtering theory. Moreover, in our Nash equilibria the fraud strategies Λ∗ are
absolutely continuous in the sense that Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗
s ds for a positive process λ
∗.
Let us first view the situation from the perspective of the account holder. If the fraudster
uses a fixed strategy Λ∗ ∈ L on the form Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗
s ds, then, under the assumption that
λ∗t also satisfies certain integrability conditions, we obtain from filtering theory (see, e.g., [31,
Chapter 8]) that the innovations process
Wˆt := Xt +
∫ t
0
E[θλ∗s|FXs ] ds
is a Brownian motion with respect to (FX ,P). Moreover,
E[θλ∗t |FXt ] = P(θ = 1|FXt )E[λ∗t |FXt , θ = 1] = Ptλˆt,
where
λˆt := E[λ∗t |FXt , θ = 1]
and the process Pt := P
Λ∗
t := E[θ| FXt ] satisfies
dPt = −λˆtPt(1− Pt) dWˆt (4)
with P0 = p. Note that if λ
∗ is in particular FX -adapted (which is the case for the equilibria
we identify in this paper, as we will see), then λˆ = λ∗ so that
dPt = −λ∗tPt(1− Pt) dWˆt.
The process P = PΛ
∗
given by (4) is the conditional probability of the existence of the
fraudster provided the fraudster uses the strategy Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗
s ds. However, it is essential in our
problem set-up that the actual strategy is not directly observable, which means that we also
need to take the effect of possible deviations from a NE into account. To do that we note that
if the fraudster deviates from Λ∗ and instead uses a strategy Λ, then the dynamics in (4) can
be expressed as
dPt = −λˆtPt(1− Pt)(dXt + λˆtPt dt) (5)
= −λˆtPt(1− Pt)(−θ dΛt + λˆtPt dt)− λˆtPt(1− Pt) dWt,
thus showing exactly how the fraudster may manipulate the belief of the account holder, i.e. the
process P , by controlling the process X. Observe that the dynamics of P given by (5) depends
on the actual strategy Λ used by the fraudster as well on the account holder’s assumption of
the fraud strategy Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗
s ds. In particular, if we condition on {θ = 1} (the fraudster is
active) and suppose that the fraudster uses an arbitrary strategy Λ, possibly different from
Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗
s ds as assumed by the account holder, then P = P
Λ is given by
dPt = −λˆtPt(1− Pt)(−dΛt + λˆtPt dt)− λˆtPt(1− Pt) dWt. (6)
Furthermore, if the fraudster uses the strategy Λ∗ as assumed by the account holder, and if λ∗
is FX -adapted so that λˆ = λ∗, then the drift in (6) is (λ∗t )2Pt(1− Pt)2 which is positive, and in
this case the fraudster thus gradually reveals her existence to the account holder. However, note
that the drift can also be negative (at most −(λ∗t )2P 2t (1 − Pt), corresponding to a flat portion
of Λ), or, at the other extreme, arbitrarily large (corresponding to a rapidly increasing Λ).
3 A pure Nash equilibrium
We provide heuristic calculations in Section 3.1 to obtain a candidate NE. The candidate NE
is summarized in Section 3.2, and further properties are obtained in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4
we then verify that this candidate indeed constitutes a NE.
5
3.1 Deriving a candidate Nash equilibrium
In this section we will look for a NE, cf. Definition 3. We emphasize that the calculations in this
section are mainly motivational; a formal verification result is provided in Section 3.4 below.
It is reasonable to guess that if the account holder is sufficiently sure that the fraudster is
active, she will pay the amount M to deactivate the fraudster, and that, from the viewpoint
of the fraudster, there should exist an optimal push rate, depending on the account holder’s
current belief, which solves the trade-off between stealing and avoiding detection. In fact, we
will look for a NE where the fraud strategy is of the form
Λ∗t =
∫ t
0
λ∗(Ps) ds (7)
for some non-negative function λ∗ to be determined (from now on λ∗ denotes such a function),
and the stopping strategy takes the form of a threshold time
τ∗ = τ b := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt ≥ b}
for some b ∈ (0, 1), where P corresponds, in equilibrium, to the conditional probability for the
account holder that the fraudster is active.
More precisely, given Λ ∈ L, consider a pair (X,P ) = (XΛ, PΛ) given by{
dXt = −θdΛt + dWt
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt) (8)
with X0 = 0 and P0 = p. Then the dynamics of P conditioned on {θ = 1} are
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(−dΛt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt)− λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWt. (9)
Hence, if the account holder uses a threshold strategy τ b for the process P , the active fraudster
faces a stochastic control problem
v(p) = sup
Λ∈L
Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ; p) = sup
Λ∈L
E
[∫ τb
0
e−rsdΛs
∣∣∣∣∣ θ = 1
]
with the underlying process being P given by (8) or, equivalently,
v(p) = sup
Λ∈L
E
[∫ τb
0
e−rsdΛs
]
(10)
with P given by (9) with P0 = p.
Remark 6. In the system (8) we use the function λ∗ (to be determined) to specify the dynamics
of P , rather than λˆt := E[λ∗(Pt)|FXt ] as in Section 2. We will see below (cf. Proposition 12) that
if the fraudster uses the control Λt = Λ
∗
t :=
∫ t
0 λ
∗(Ps) ds, then Λ∗ is FX-adapted; consequently, in
that case, λˆt = λ
∗(Pt), and Pt then coincides with E[θ|FXt ]. Hence P corresponds, in equilibrium,
to the conditional probability for the account holder that the fraudster is active.
Using the dynamic programming principle we expect that if λ∗ corresponds to a NE fraud
strategy — i.e. if Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗(Ps) ds with P given by (9) is optimal in (10) — then it should
hold that
1
2
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2vpp − (λ∗)2p2(1− p)vp + λ∗p(1− p)λvp − rv + λ ≤ 0 (11)
for all constants λ ≥ 0 in the continuation region of the NE stopping strategy, i.e. for 0 < p < b.
(To ease the presentation we have suppressed the dependence on p in the functions in (11), a
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convention we will use throughout the paper.) Similarly, by optimality of λ∗ we expect equality
in (11) when λ = λ∗, i.e.,
1
2
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2vpp − (λ∗)2p2(1− p)vp + (λ∗)2p(1− p)vp − rv + λ∗ = 0 (12)
for 0 < p < b. Subtracting (11) from (12) yields
(λ∗ − λ)(λ∗p(1− p)vp + 1) ≥ 0
for all λ ≥ 0, which implies that
λ∗ > 0
and hence
λ∗p(1− p)vp + 1 = 0
for 0 < p < b. Inserting
λ∗ = − 1
p(1− p)vp
into (12) and multiplying by vp yields a non-linear ordinary differential equation
vpp
2vp
− 1
1− p − rvvp = 0. (13)
This can be integrated, and using separation of variables we find
e−rv
2
dv =
A
(1− p)2 dp.
The general solution thus satisfies
Φ(
√
2rv(p)) =
B
1− p + C,
where
Φ(y) =
∫ y
−∞
ϕ(z) dz and ϕ(z) =
1√
2pi
exp{−z2/2}
are the distribution function and the density of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
Imposing the boundary conditions v(b) = 0 (which we expect since there is no possibility left
for the fraudster to steal after τ b) and v(0+) := limp↘0 v(p) =∞ (corresponding to unbounded
possibilities for the fraudster to steal in the limit as p→ 0) yields
Φ(
√
2rv(p)) =
1
2b
+
1
2
− 1
2b
1− b
1− p. (14)
The function v(p) implicitly given in (14) is thus a candidate equilibrium value function for the
fraudster (recall, however, that the threshold b is yet to be determined).
We now turn to the perspective of the account holder. For a given fraud strategy Λ∗ of the
form (7), the account holder faces an optimal stopping problem
u(p) := inf
τ∈T
J 1(τ,Λ∗; p) = inf
τ∈T
E
[
θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps) ds+ e−rτMI{τ<∞}
]
, (15)
where we expect that the underlying process P = PΛ
∗
given by (8) (with Λ = Λ∗) coincides
with E[θ|FXt ], and that
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWˆt,
7
where Wˆ := Xt +
∫ t
0 λ
∗(Ps)Ps ds is a Brownian motion with respect to (FX ,P), see Section 2.
Arguing heuristically, we may thus use iterated expectations to replace θ with P in (15) and
then we expect, based on the dynamic programming principle, that
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ pλ∗ = 0, 0 < p < b (16)
u(0) = 0
u(b) = M,
where the boundary conditions come from the account holder having zero expected cost if there
is no fraudster and from immediate stopping at the boundary b.
Recall from the discussion above that a NE fraud strategy should satisfy
λ∗ = − 1
p(1− p)vp =
√
2rϕ(
√
2rv)
2b
1− b
1− p
p
(the second equality is derived from (14)), which inserted into (16) gives
upp
2vp
− ruvp − 1
1− p = 0 (17)
for 0 < p < b. Comparing with (13) we see that u = v is a particular solution to (17). Moreover,
making the Ansatz u(p) = (1 − p)f(v(p)) for the homogenous part (for some function f to be
determined) yields
up = (1− p)f ′(v)vp − f(v)
upp = (1− p)f ′′(v)v2p + (1− p)f ′(v)vpp − 2f ′(v)vp.
Inserting these expressions into (17) and using that
vpp
2vp
= rvvp +
1
1−p by (13) we find that the
homogeneous part of (17) can be written as
1
2
f ′′(v) + rvf ′(v)− rf(v) = 0.
The linear ordinary differential equation
1
2
f ′′(x) + rxf ′(x)− rf(x) = 0
has general solution
Ax+BF (
√
2rx),
where
F (y) := ϕ(y)− yΨ(y)
and
Ψ(y) := 1− Φ(y) =
∫ ∞
y
ϕ(z) dz.
A candidate for the equilibrium value function of the account holder is thus
u(p) = A(1− p)v(p) +B(1− p)F (
√
2rv(p)) + v(p), (18)
where A and B (and b which is hidden implicitly in v) are yet to be determined.
Before turning to these constants, we make some observations concerning the function F .
Lemma 7. The function F satisfies
(i) F (y) ≥ 0;
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(ii) limy→∞ F (y) = 0;
(iii) limy↘0 F (y) = 1√2pi ;
(iv) limy↘0 F ′(y) = −12 .
Proof. (i) is immediate from the standard estimate
y
∫ ∞
y
ϕ(z) dz ≤
∫ ∞
y
zϕ(z) dz = ϕ(y).
(ii) then follows since (i) implies 0 ≤ F (y) ≤ ϕ(y)→ 0 as y →∞. (iii) is obvious. Finally, (iv)
follows from F ′(y) = −Ψ(y).
We now impose boundary conditions for the candidate equilibrium value function u(p). More
precisely, we wish to determine the constants A,B, and b so that, first of all, u(0+) = 0 and
u(b) = M . Recalling v(0+) = ∞ and v(b) = 0, and using (ii) and (iii) from Lemma 7, we get
from (18) that
A = −1 and B = M
√
2pi
1− b ,
so
u(p) = pv(p) +M
√
2pi
1− p
1− bF (
√
2rv(p)).
To determine the unknown stopping boundary b, we impose the principle of smooth fit from
optimal stopping theory, which for us takes the form up(b) = 0. We have that
up(p) = v(p) + pvp(p)− M
√
2pi
1− b
(
F (
√
2rv(p)) + (1− p)Ψ(
√
2rv(p))
√
2rvp(p)
)
so
up(b) = bvp(b)− M
√
2pi
1− b
(
F (
√
2rv(b)) + (1− b)Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
√
2rvp(b)
)
(19)
= bvp(b)− M
1− b −M
√
rpivp(b).
Differentiation of (14) gives
vp(b) = −
√
pi
2
√
rb(1− b) , (20)
and plugging this and up(b) = 0 into (19) yields
b =
Mpi
√
r√
pi + 2M
√
r
.
3.2 The candidate Nash equilibrium
We now summarize the specification of our candidate Nash equilibrium (τ b,Λ∗). Let
b :=
Mpi
√
r√
pi + 2M
√
r
, (21)
and assume that
M ≤ Mˆ :=
√
pi
2
√
r
(22)
(this bound has not been discussed yet, but we include it here as it is essential in the verification
below, cf. Lemma 11 below). The expression (21) for b is increasing in M , and thus
b =
Mpi
√
r√
pi + 2M
√
r
≤ Mˆpi
√
r√
pi + 2Mˆ
√
r
= pi/4 < 1.
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Define v (the candidate equilibrium value function for the fraudster in the interim version of the
game, cf. Remark 4) by
v(p) =
{
1√
2r
Φ−1
(
1− (1−b)pb(1−p) 12
)
0 < p < b
0 p ≥ b
(23)
and u (the candidate equilibrium value function for the account holder) by
u(p) =
{
pv(p) +M
√
2pi 1−p1−bF (
√
2rv(p)) 0 < p < b
M p ≥ b. (24)
Next, let
λ∗(p) =
{ −1
p(1−p)vp(p) 0 < p < b
2b
√
r
p
√
pi
p ≥ b (25)
(using (20) one sees that the second line of (25) corresponds to a continuous extension of λ∗).
Furthermore, let (X,P ) = (XΛ, PΛ) for Λ ∈ L be defined by{
dXt = −θ dΛt + dWt
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt) (26)
with X0 = 0 and P0 = p. Our candidate NE is given by (τ
b,Λ∗) with
τ b = inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt ≥ b} (27)
and
Λ∗t =
∫ t
0
λ∗(Ps) ds. (28)
For graphical illustrations of λ∗, u and v, see Figures 1(a)-1(b).
(a) (b)
Figure 1: The intensity of the equilibrium fraudster strategy λ∗, the threshold for the account
holder equilibrium stopping strategy b, and the equilibrium value functions u (account holder)
and v (fraudster, interim version of the game); cf. Section 3.2. We also include the fraudster
equilibrium value function pv in the ex ante game, cf. Remark 4. The parameters are r = 0.05
and M = 3 (note that M < Mˆ ≈ 3.96, where Mˆ is defined in (22)).
Remark 8. Suppose a fraud strategy Λ ∈ L is given. Then X is given by Xt = Wt on {θ = 0}
and by Xt = Wt + Λt on {θ = 1}. Thus the second equation of (26) is a stochastic differential
equation driven by a continuous semimartingale X with drift and diffusion coefficients
− (λ∗)2p2(1− p) =
{ −1
(1−p)v2p 0 < p < b
−4rpi b2(1− p) p ≥ b
(29)
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and
− λ∗p(1− p) =
{
1
vp
0 < p < b
−2
√
rb√
pi
(1− p) p ≥ b, (30)
respectively. These coefficients are Lipschitz on any interval [, 1],  > 0, so a strong solution P
exists, at least up to a potential explosion at 0.
Also note that the fraudster observes θ and chooses Λ, and can then solve the system (26).
The account holder, on the other hand, only observes a path of X, and calculates P using the
second equation of (26) in a pathwise manner. By the results of [24], they obtain the same P .
To show that the process P cannot reach zero in finite time we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 9. There exist constants A > 0 and B > 0 such that, for all x ≥ B, it holds that
ϕ(x) ≤ A
√
ln
(
1
Ψ(x)
)
Ψ(x).
Proof. Recall that xΨ(x) ≤ ϕ(x) so that 1Ψ(x) ≥ xϕ(x) , and that limx→∞ ϕ(x)xΨ(x) = 1. Thus there
exist constants B,C,D > 0 such that for all x ≥ B it holds that
C
xΨ(x)
ϕ(x)
√
ln
1
Ψ(x)
≥
√
ln
1
Ψ(x)
≥
√
lnx− lnϕ(x)
≥
√
lnx+
x2
2
≥ Dx.
The result thus follows by setting A = C/D.
Proposition 10. Given any fraud strategy Λ ∈ L, the SDE (26) has a strong solution (X,P ) =
(XΛ, PΛ), with
τ0 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt = 0} =∞ a.s. (31)
Moreover, the fraud strategy Λ∗ in (28) is admissible in the sense that it satisfies Λ∗ ∈ L.
Proof. Suppose a fraud strategy Λ ∈ L is given. The existence of a strong solution was estab-
lished in Remark 8. To see that (31) holds, note that it suffices to show that (31) holds on
{θ = 0}, since it then follows from comparison (see [36, Chapter IX.3]) that (31) holds also on
{θ = 1} since Λ is non-decreasing (implying that the drift for P is minimal when θ = 0). Again
by comparison, it suffices to check non-explosion at 0 for the SDE
dP˜t = − C
v2p(P˜t)
− 1
vp(P˜t)
dWt
for any constant C > 0. For such a diffusion, the densities of the scale function and speed
measure are
s′(a) = e2Ca
and
m(p) = 2v2p(p)e
−2Cp,
respectively. Using Fubini’s Theorem, we thus obtain∫ z
0
(∫ z
a
m(p)dp
)
s′(a) da =
∫ z
0
(∫ p
0
e2Cada
)
2v2p(p)e
−2Cp dp
≥ D1
∫ z
0
pv2p(p) dp
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(here and below Di, i = 1, 2, 3 denote positive constants). From (23) we have
Ψ(
√
2rv(p)) = 1− Φ(
√
2rv(p)) =
(1− b)p
2b(1− p) , (32)
which differentiated yields
pv2p(p) =
D2p
(1− p)4ϕ2(√2rv(p)) ≥
D2p
ϕ2(
√
2rv(p))
.
Using the above and Lemma 9 (assuming that z is small enough) we find that∫ z
0
(∫ z
a
m(p)dp
)
s′(a) da ≥ D1D2
∫ z
0
p
ϕ2(
√
2rv(p))
dp
≥ A−2D1D2
∫ z
0
p
ln
(
1
Ψ(
√
2rv(p))
)
Ψ2(
√
2rv(p))
dp
= A−2D1D2
∫ z
0
p(
1−b
2b
p
1−p
)2
ln
(
2b
1−b
1−p
p
) dp
≥ D3
∫ z
0
1
−p ln p dp =∞.
Consequently, (31) follows by Feller’s test for explosion.
Now consider Λ∗ defined in (28). Then the dynamics for P in (26) can be written as
dPt = (λ
∗(Pt))2Pt(1− Pt)(θ − Pt) dt− λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWt. (33)
Note that the diffusion coefficient in (33) is also in this case given by (30), and that the drift
coefficient is given by (29) on {θ = 0}, and by
(λ∗(Pt))2Pt(1− Pt)2 =
{
1
pv2p(p)
0 < p < b
4r
pi
b2
p (1− p)2 p ≥ b.
(34)
on {θ = 1}. However, the drift coefficient (34) is also locally Lipschitz and we thus obtain
the existence of a strong solution P as in the case above. Using also that λ∗ in (25) is a
positive function (which is easy to verify) we conclude that Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗(Ps) ds is a continuous
non-decreasing process adapted to FW,θ, so Λ∗ ∈ L.
3.3 Properties of the candidate Nash equilibrium
In this section we derive a few further properties of the candidate Nash equilibrium that are
needed in the verification below.
Lemma 11. Assume that M ≤ Mˆ . Then u defined in (24) (with v in (23)) satisfies u ≤M .
Proof. To prove the claim we will show that the function u is concave provided M ≤ Mˆ . Indeed,
concavity of u together with the smooth fit condition up(b) = 0 imply u ≤M . For the concavity
of u it follows from (16) that it suffices to prove ru ≤ λ∗p for all p ∈ (0, b).
To do that, note that
u(p) = pv(p) +M
√
2pi
1− p
1− bF (
√
2rv(p))
= pv(p) +M
√
2pi
1− p
1− bϕ(
√
2rv(p))−M√rpiv(p)p
b
,
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where we used (32). Consequently,
λ∗p− ru =
√
2rϕ(
√
2rv(p))
2b(1− p)
1− b − rpv(p)−Mr
√
2pi
1− p
1− bϕ(
√
2rv(p)) + rM
√
rpiv(p)
p
b
=
(
2b−M√rpi)√2r1− p
1− bϕ(
√
2rv(p)) +
(
M
√
rpi − b) rpv(p)
b
.
Since 2b ≥M√rpi follows from M ≤ Mˆ , and since
M
√
rpi − b = M√rpi
(
1−
√
pi√
pi + 2M
√
r
)
≥ 0,
it follows that λ∗p ≥ ru, which completes the proof.
We next establish that if the fraudster uses the candidate NE strategy then the process P
corresponds to the account holder’s conditional probability of existence of the fraudster (in line
with Section 2).
Proposition 12. Suppose Λ = Λ∗ (see (25) and (28)) in the SDE (26), i.e., suppose the
fraudster uses the (candidate) NE strategy. Then, for the solution (X,P ) = (XΛ
∗
, PΛ
∗
), it holds
that
Pt = E
[
θ| FXt
]
and
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWˆt (35)
a.s. with P0 = p, where
Wˆt := Xt +
∫ t
0
λ∗(Ps)Ps ds
is a Brownian motion with respect to (FX ,P).
Proof. First observe that P is FX -adapted, so that E[θλ∗(Pt)|FXt ] = λ∗(Pt)Πt, where Πt :=
E[θ|FXt ]. Consequently, by [31, Chapter 8.1] we have
dΠt = −λ∗(Pt)Πt(1−Πt) dW¯t,
where the innovations process
W¯t := Xt +
∫ t
0
λ∗(Ps)Πs ds
is a Brownian motion with respect to (FX ,P) (formally, to use [31, Theorem 8.1] one needs
to localize by, e.g., setting λ∗n := λ∗ ∧ n; however, since P does not reach 0 in finite time by
Proposition 10, there is no problem when letting n→∞). Thus
dΠt = −λ∗(Pt)Πt(1−Πt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Πt dt),
and by (26),
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt),
so by uniqueness of solutions we find that P = Π. Therefore, W¯ = Wˆ , and (35) holds.
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3.4 A verification theorem for the pure Nash equilibrium
In this subsection we verify that the pair (τ b,Λ∗) defined above indeed constitutes a NE for our
game, provided M ≤ Mˆ where Mˆ is defined in (22).
Theorem 13. (Verification.) Assume that the account holder’s cost for stopping satisfies
M ≤ Mˆ . Then the pair (τ b,Λ∗) defined in (27) and (28) is a NE in the sense of Definition 3.
Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium value functions for the account holder and the fraudster
(in the interim version of the game) are given by (24) and (23), i.e.,
u(p) = J 1(τ b,Λ∗; p) and v(p) = Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ∗; p).
Proof. Optimality of τ b. We first show that τ b is an optimal stopping time for the account
holder provided the fraudster uses Λ∗, i.e., that J 1(τ,Λ∗; p) ≥ J 1(τ b,Λ∗; p) for any stopping
time τ ∈ T.
By construction, u ∈ C2((0, b)∩ (b, 1))∩C1((0, 1)), and the limits upp(b−) and upp(b+) both
exist, which is sufficient to apply Itoˆ’s formula in its standard form, cf. [26, Problem 3.6.24].
Moreover,
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ λ∗p ≥ 0 (36)
for all p ∈ (0, b) ∪ (b, 1). Indeed, for p < b, (36) holds with equality by (17), and for p > b we
have u = M so
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ λ∗p = −rM + 2b
√
r√
pi
=
rM(
√
pi − 2√rM)√
pi + 2M
√
r
≥ 0, (37)
where we used b = Mpi
√
r√
pi+2M
√
r
and M ≤ Mˆ =
√
pi
2
√
r
.
Hence, using that the dynamics of P satisfies (35) and Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain for any
stopping time τ ∈ T
e−r(τ∧n)u(Pτ∧n) = u(p)
+
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rt
(
(λ∗(Pt))2P 2t (1− Pt)2
2
upp(Pt)− ru(Pt)
)
1{Pt 6=b}dt
−
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)up(Pt)dWˆt
≥ u(p)−
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt)Ptdt
+
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rt
up(Pt)
vp(Pt)
1{Pt<b}dWˆt. (38)
The stochastic integral on the right hand side of (38) is in fact a martingale term since the
integrand is bounded. Therefore, taking expectation in (38), and using also Lemma 11, Propo-
sition 12, Fubini’s theorem and iterated expectations, yields
u(p) ≤ E
[
e−r(τ∧n)u(Pτ∧n) +
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt)Pt dt
]
≤ E
[
e−r(τ∧n)M +
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt)E[θ| FXt ] dt
]
= E
[
e−r(τ∧n)M + θ
∫ τ∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt) dt
]
.
Using monotone convergence we thus find that
u(p) ≤ E
[
e−rτMI{τ<∞} + θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsλ∗(Pt)dt
]
= J 1(τ,Λ∗; p).
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Repeating the above argument with τ b instead of τ gives
u(p) = E
[
e−r(τ
b∧n)u(Pτb∧n) + θ
∫ τb∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt) dt
]
≥ E
[
e−rτ
b
MI{τb≤n} + θ
∫ τb∧n
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt) dt
]
,
and monotone convergence thus yields
u(p) ≥ E
[
e−rτ
b
MI{τb<∞} + θ
∫ τb
0
e−rtλ∗(Pt)dt
]
= J 1(τ b,Λ∗; p).
Consequently,
u(p) = J 1(τ b,Λ∗; p) = inf
τ∈T
J 1(τ,Λ∗; p).
Optimality of Λ∗. We now fix τ b as defined in (27) and show that the strategy defined
by (28) is an optimal strategy for the fraudster, i.e., that Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ∗; p) ≥ Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ; p) for any
fraud strategy Λ ∈ L. Note that the dynamics of P in (26) can when conditioning on {θ = 1}
be written as
dPt = λ
∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dΛt − λ∗(Pt)Pt dt)− λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWt. (39)
Let Λ ∈ L be an arbitrary fraud strategy, and consider the process
Nt := e
−r(t∧τb)v(Pt∧τb) +
∫ t∧τb
0
e−rsdΛs.
Using Itoˆ’s formula, (13) and (25), we find that
dNt = e
−rt
(
1
2
(λ∗(Pt))2P 2t (1− Pt)2vpp(Pt)− rv(Pt)
)
dt
+e−rtλ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)vp(Pt)(dΛt − λ∗(Pt)Pt dt) + e−rtdΛt
−e−rtλ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)vp(Pt) dWt
= e−rt dWt
for t ≤ τ b. Consequently, N is a lower bounded martingale with bounded quadratic variation.
The optional sampling theorem thus implies that
v(p) = N0 = E[Nτb |θ = 1] ≥ E
[∫ τb
0
e−rtdΛt
∣∣∣∣∣ θ = 1
]
= Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ; p),
so v(p) ≥ supΛ∈L Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ; p) since Λ was arbitrary.
Conversely, if Λ = Λ∗, then (39) reduces to
dPt = (λ
∗(Pt))2Pt(1− Pt)2dt− λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWt.
We now claim that τ b <∞ a.s. To see this, first note that the process P cannot reach 0 in finite
time by Proposition 10. Moreover, the time-changed process
P˜t := P∫ t
0 v
2
p(Ps) ds
is a 3-dimensional Bessel process, for which it is well-known that τ˜ b := inf{t ≥ 0 : P˜t ≥ b} is
finite a.s.; since P cannot reach 0, this implies that also τ b =
∫ τ˜b
0 v
2
p(Ps) ds <∞ a.s.
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Redefining Nt with Λt = Λ
∗
t and recalling that v(Pτb) = v(b) = 0 we thus find, with optional
sampling, that
v(p) = N0 = E[Nτb |θ = 1] = E
[
e−rτ
b
v(Pτb) +
∫ τb
0
e−rtdΛ∗t
∣∣∣∣∣ θ = 1
]
= Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ∗; p).
Thus
v(p) = Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ∗; p) = sup
Λ∈L
Jˆ 2(τ b,Λ; p),
which, in view of Remark 4, completes the proof.
Remark 14. A closer inspection of the proof above shows that the specification of λ∗ on (b, 1)
is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, any specification with λ∗p ≥ rM on (b, 1) (cf. (37)) would give
a NE (τ b,Λ∗).
Remark 15. In equilibrium, the relation
Xt = v(Pt)− v(p)− r
∫ t
0
v(Ps) ds
holds (indeed, this can be checked by applying Itoˆ’s formula to the right hand side and then
compare with the equilibrium dynamics of X). In the other direction, we have been unable to
determine the exact form of the functional mapping of a path of X into a value of P .
4 A Nash equilibrium with randomized stopping
In order to find an equilibrium for the remaining case, in which the cost of stopping satisfies
M > Mˆ =
√
pi
2
√
r
, we will in this section expand the class of allowed stopping strategies for the
account holder to include randomized stopping rules. Thus, instead of looking for an equilibrium
with a threshold time τ b as in Section 3.1 we here look for an equilibrium with a randomized
stopping time specified by an intensity β with which the account holder stops; in particular, the
equilibrium intensity depends on the conditional probability the account holder assigns to the
existence of the fraudster.
Definition 16 (Randomized stopping time). Let A be the family of right-continuous non-
decreasing processes Γ which are adapted to the filtration FX and with Γ0− = 0. Let U be
a random variable which is Exp(1)-distributed and independent of all other random sources. A
randomized stopping time γ is a random variable of the form
γ := γΓ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Γt > U}
where Γ ∈ A. We say that the random time γ is generated by the process Γ, and we denote the
class of randomized stopping times by Tr.
Given a pair (γ,Λ) ∈ (Tr,L), we define as before the expected cost
J 1(γ,Λ; p) = E
[
θ
∫ γ
0
e−rsdΛs + e−rγMI{γ<∞}
]
for the account holder, the ex ante expected payoff
J 2(γ,Λ; p) = E
[
θ
∫ γ
0
e−rsdΛs
]
,
for the fraudster, and the expected payoff
Jˆ 2(γ,Λ; p) = E
[∫ γ
0
e−rsdΛs
∣∣∣∣ θ = 1]
for the fraudster in the interim version of the game.
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Definition 17 (Mixed stopping Nash equilibrium). A pair of strategies (γ∗,Λ∗) ∈ (Tr,L) is a
mixed stopping Nash equilibrium (msNE) if
J 1(γ∗,Λ∗; p) ≤ J 1(γ,Λ∗; p)
J 2(γ∗,Λ∗; p) ≥ J 2(γ∗,Λ; p),
or, equivalently,
J 1(γ∗,Λ∗; p) ≤ J 1(γ,Λ∗; p)
Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ∗; p) ≥ Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ; p)
for any (γ,Λ) ∈ (Tr,L).
4.1 Derivation of a mixed stopping Nash equilibrium
In this section we will look for a msNE in the sense of Definition 17. We use heuristic reasoning
to obtain a candidate equilibrium which we later verify in Section 4.4. As in Section 3.1 we
consider a process P given by
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt)
for some non-negative function λ∗ to be determined. We will look for a msNE where the fraud
strategy is of the kind (7) and the stopping strategy is a randomized stopping time generated
by a process Γ on the form Γt =
∫ t
0 β(Ps) ds for some function β; thus β specifies the intensity
with which the account holder stops. Moreover, we conjecture that β has the form
β(p) =

0 0 < p ≤ b
positive b < p < a
∞ p ≥ a
for some a, b with b < a, where the infinite intensity should be understood as immediate stopping
whenever Pt ≥ a. From the fraudster’s perspective, martingale arguments as in Section 3.1 again
suggest that with Λ∗t =
∫ t
0 λ
∗(Ps) ds, the equilibrium value function v should on the interval (0, a)
satisfy
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
vpp − (λ∗)2p2(1− p)vp + λ∗p(1− p)λvp − rv − βv + λ ≤ 0
for all λ ≥ 0 and
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
vpp − (λ∗)2p2(1− p)vp + (λ∗)2p(1− p)vp − rv − βv + λ∗ = 0, (40)
cf. (11) and (12), respectively. Consequently,
λ∗p(1− p)vp + 1 = 0, (41)
which inserted in (40) leads to a non-linear equation
vpp
2vp
− rvvp − βvvp − 1
1− p = 0 (42)
on (0, a). Specializing to the interval (0, b) where β = 0, we have that
vpp
2vp
− rvvp − 1
1− p = 0
with general solution
Φ(
√
2rv(p)) =
C
1− p +D.
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Imposing the boundary condition v(0+) =∞ yields C +D = 1 so that, for 0 < p < b,
Φ(
√
2rv(p)) =
Cp
1− p + 1,
or, equivalently,
Ψ(
√
2rv(p)) =
−Cp
1− p. (43)
However, since the account holder does not stop with certainty at p = b, we do not impose
v(b) = 0, so the constant C remains to be specified.
Next, we expect, as in Section 3.1, that the value function u of the account holder satisfies
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ pλ∗ = 0
in the interval (0, b) where stopping does not happen. Solving the equation above using (41)
and the boundary conditions u(0) = 0 and u(b) = M gives
u(p) = A(1− p)v(p) +B(1− p)F (
√
2rv(p)) + v(p)
= pv(p) + (M − bv(b))(1− p)F (
√
2rv(p))
(1− b)F (√2rv(b)) (44)
for 0 < p ≤ b.
By the indifference principle in game theory, we also expect that the expected cost for the
account holder is constantly equal to M for b < p < a where the intensity of stopping is positive.
Imposing u = M on the interval (b, a), and using martingale arguments as above, we find that
0 =
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ pλ∗ = −rM + pλ∗
so that
λ∗ =
rM
p
for b ≤ p ≤ a. By (41) we thus have
vp = − 1
rM(1− p) , (45)
and integration yields
v =
1
rM
ln(1− p) + E.
Imposing the boundary condition v(a) = 0 (with the motivation that there is no possibility for
the fraudster to act after reaching a) gives
v(p) =
1
rM
ln
1− p
1− a (46)
for b ≤ p ≤ a.
Note that in (44), the free boundary b and the value v(b) (equivalently, b and the constant
C in (43)) are still unknown. Imposing the smooth fit condition up(b) = 0 gives
v(b) + bvp(b) = (M − bv(b))
(
1
1− b +
√
2rvp(b)Ψ(
√
2rv(b)))
F (
√
2rv(b))
)
,
which simplifies to
M − v(b)
1− b +
M
√
2rΨ(
√
2rv(b))− bϕ(√2rv(b))
F (
√
2rv(b))
vp(b) = 0. (47)
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Moreover, imposing vp(b−) = vp(b+) we obtain from (43) and (45) that
vp(b) =
C√
2r(1− b)2ϕ(√2rv(b)) = −
1
rM(1− b) . (48)
Using (43) in (48) we find that
b =
√
rMΨ(
√
2rv(b))√
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
, (49)
so (47) simplifies to
M − v(b)
1− b +
M
√
r/2Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
F (
√
2rv(b))
vp(b) = 0. (50)
Moreover, inserting the second expression for vp(b) in (48) into (50) yields
√
2r(M − v(b)) = Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
F (
√
2rv(b))
,
i.e., √
2r(M − v(b))F (
√
2rv(b))−Ψ(
√
2rv(b)) = 0. (51)
Note that (51) is an equation in the single unknown variable v(b).
Lemma 18. Assume that M > Mˆ =
√
pi
2
√
r
. Then equation (51) has a unique positive solution
v(b). Moreover, v(b) ∈ (0,M/2).
Proof. Let f(z) :=
√
2r(M − z)F (√2rz) − Ψ(√2rz). Then f(0) =
√
rM√
pi
− 12 > 0 and f(z) < 0
for z ≥M , so a solution to f(z) = 0 exists in (0,M) by continuity. Differentiation yields
f ′(z) = 2rΨ(
√
2rz)(2z −M).
Thus, f is strictly decreasing up toM/2 and increasing for z > M2 . Consequently, since f(M) < 0
the solution must be unique and satisfy v(b) ∈ (0,M/2).
Inserting (45) in (42) we get
βv
1
r2M2(1− p)2 =
vpp
2
− vp
(1− p) − rvv
2
p =
1
2rM
1
(1− p)2 − rv
1
r2M2(1− p)2
which yields the candidate equilibrium stopping intensity
β(p) =
rM
2v(p)
− r
for b < p < a. Note that since v is decreasing on (b, a) by (46),
β(p) =
rM
2v(p)
− r ≥ rM
2v(b)
− r > 0
by Lemma 18.
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4.2 The candidate msNE
We now summarize by describing our candidate for a msNE and the corresponding value func-
tions for the case
M > Mˆ =
√
pi
2
√
r
. (52)
Let v(b) be the unique positive solution of
√
2r(M − v(b))F (
√
2rv(b))−Ψ(
√
2rv(b)) = 0, (53)
cf. Lemma 18, and let
b :=
√
rMΨ(
√
2rv(b))√
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
(54)
(in Section 4.3 below we verify that b < 1) and
a := 1− (1− b)e−rMv(b),
cf. (49) and (46), respectively. Define v (the candidate equilibrium value function for the
fraudster in the interim version of the game) by
v(p) = 1√
2r
Φ−1
(
1− (1−b)pb(1−p)
(
1− Φ(√2rv(b)))) 0 < p ≤ b
v(p) = 1rM ln
1−p
1−b b < p ≤ a
v(p) = 0 p > a
(55)
and u (the candidate equilibrium value function for the account holder) by
u(p) =
{
pv(p) + (M − bv(b)) (1−p)F (
√
2rv(p))
(1−b)F (√2rv(b)) 0 < p ≤ b
M p > b.
(56)
Set
β(p) =

0 0 < p ≤ b
rM
2v(p) − r b < p < a
∞ p ≥ a
and
λ∗(p) =
{ −1
p(1−p)vp(p) 0 < p ≤ b
rM
p b < p < 1.
Furthermore, let (X,P ) = (XΛ, PΛ) for Λ ∈ L be defined by{
dXt = −θdΛt + dWt
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt)
with X0 = 0 and P0 = p. Our candidate msNE (γ
∗,Λ∗) is then given by
γ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Γ∗t > U} (57)
with Γ∗t :=
∫ t
0 β(Ps) ds and U ∼ Exp(1), and
Λ∗t =
∫ t
0
λ∗(Ps) ds. (58)
For graphical illustrations of λ∗, β, and the corresponding equilibrium value functions, see
Figures 2(a)-2(b) and 3.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: The intensity of the equilibrium fraudster strategy λ∗ and the intensity of the
account holder equilibrium stopping strategy β for the msNE, cf. Section 4.2. The parameters
are r = 0.05 and M = 5 (note that M > Mˆ ≈ 3.96).
4.3 Properties of the candidate msNE
Propositions 10 and 12 hold also in the current case. In this section we show that also b < 1
and u ≤M hold.
Lemma 19. Assume that (52) holds. Then the value b defined in (54) satisfies b < 1.
Proof. From (49) and (53) we know that
b =
√
rMΨ(
√
2rv(b))√
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
=
(
Ψ(
√
2rv(b)) +
√
2rv(b)F (
√
2rv(b))
)
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
2F (
√
2rv(b))ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
,
so it suffices to check that
Ψ2(z) + zϕ(z)Ψ(z)− z2Ψ2(z) < 2ϕ2(z)− 2zϕ(z)Ψ(z),
or, equivalently,
2
ϕ2(z)
Ψ2(z)
− 3z ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
+ z2 > 1 (59)
for all z > 0. However, (59) is a well-known inequality that holds for all z ∈ R; for completeness,
we provide the following argument from [37]. Define
f(z) := 2
ϕ2(z)
Ψ2(z)
− 3z ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
+ z2 =
(
ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
− z
)(
2
ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
− z
)
and note that f(z)→∞ as z → −∞ and f(z)→ 1 as z →∞ since
ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
= z + z−1 + o(z−1)
as z →∞. Moreover,
f ′(z) = −2
(
ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
− z
)(
1 + z
ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
− ϕ
2(z)
Ψ2(z)
)
− ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
(1− f(z)) (60)
< −ϕ(z)
Ψ(z)
(1− f(z)).
If f(z0) = 1 for some z0 ∈ R, then there exists a z ≥ z0 with f(z) ≤ 1 and f ′(z) = 0, which
contradicts (60). Consequently, f > 1, which proves (59).
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Figure 3: The equilibrium value functions u (account holder) and v (fraudster, interim version
of the game) for the msNE, cf. Section 4.2. We also include the fraudster equilibrium value
function pv (msNE) in the ex ante game, cf. Remark 4. The parameters are as in Figures 2(a)-
2(b).
Lemma 20. The function u defined in (56) (with v defined in (55)) satisfies u ≤M .
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 11 it suffices to show that λ∗p− ru ≥ 0 for p ∈ (0, b) and we
therefore assume that p ∈ (0, b) in this proof. By definition of v(b), v and F we have that
Ψ(
√
2rv(p))
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
=
1− b
1− p
p
b
and
F (
√
2rv(p))
F (
√
2rv(b))
=
√
2r(M − v(b))ϕ(
√
2rv(p))−√2rv(p)Ψ(√2rv(p))
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
.
We obtain
u(p) = pv(p) + (M − bv(b))(1− p)F (
√
2rv(p))
(1− b)F (√2rv(b))
= pv(p) +D
1− p
1− b
ϕ(
√
2rv(p))−√2rv(p)Ψ(√2rv(p))
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
= pv(p) +D
1− p
1− b
ϕ(
√
2rv(p))
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
−Dp
b
√
2rv(p)
= pv(p)
(
1−
√
2r
D
b
)
+
(1− p)ϕ(√2rv(p))D
(1− b)Ψ(√2rv(b)) ,
where D :=
√
2r(M − v(b))(M − bv(b)).
Using the definition of λ∗ and differentiation of the expression for v(p) we also find that
λ∗(p)p =
−1
(1− p)vp(p) =
√
2r(1− p)bϕ(√2rv(p))
(1− b)Ψ(√2rv(b)) .
Hence,
λ∗(p)p− ru(p) = pv(p)r
(√
2r
D
b
− 1
)
+ (1− p)ϕ(
√
2rv(p))
√
2rb− rD
(1− b)Ψ(√2rv(b)) (61)
= A
(
pv(p) + (1− p)ϕ(
√
2rv(p))B
)
,
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where A := r
(√
2rDb − 1
)
and
B :=
√
2rb− rD
(1− b)Ψ(√2rv(b))A.
Since λ∗(b)b = ru(b) = rM , it follows that (61) evaluated at p = b equals 0, so that
λ∗(p)p− ru(p) = A
(
pv(p)− (1− p)ϕ(
√
2rv(p))
bv(b)
(1− b)ϕ(√2rv(b))
)
Next,
bA/r =
√
2rD − b
= 2r(M − v(b))(M − bv(b))− b
=
√
2r
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
F (
√
2rv(b))
(
M −
√
rMΨ(
√
2rv(b))√
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
v(b)
)
−
√
rMΨ(
√
2rv(b))√
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
=
√
2r
Ψ(
√
2rv(b))
F (
√
2rv(b))
(
M −
√
rMΨ(
√
2rv(b))√
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
v(b)− MF (
√
2rv(b))
2ϕ(
√
2rv(b))
)
=
√
2r
MΨ(
√
2rv(b))
2F (
√
2rv(b))
> 0,
so A > 0. Thus we are done if we can show that
G(p) :=
pv(p)
(1− p)ϕ(√2rv(p))
is a decreasing function (since this implies that λ∗(p)p− ru(p) ≥ 0 for 0 < p < b). To do that,
differentiate to get
(1− p)2ϕ2(
√
2rv(p))Gp(p) = v(p)ϕ(
√
2rv(p)) + p(1− p)ϕ(
√
2rv(p))
(
1 + 2rv2(p)
)
vp(p)
= v(p)ϕ(
√
2rv(p))− (1 + 2rv2(p)) Ψ(√2rv(p))√
2r
,
which is negative since xϕ(x) ≤ (1 + x2)Ψ(x) for all x.
4.4 Verification for the mixed stopping Nash equilibrium
In this section we prove that the candidate msNE (γ∗,Λ∗) defined in Section 4.2 is indeed a
msNE.
Theorem 21. (Verification.) Assume that the account holder’s cost for stopping satisfies
M > Mˆ . Then, the pair (γ∗,Λ∗) defined in (57) and (58) is a msNE in the sense of Definition
17. Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium value functions for the account holder and the
fraudster (in the interim version of the game) are given by (56) and (55), i.e.,
u(p) = J 1(γ∗,Λ∗; p) and v(p) = Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ∗; p).
Proof. Optimality of γ∗. First note that
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ λ∗p = 0 (62)
for p ∈ (0, 1) \ {b}. In fact, (62) holds with equality on (0, b) by construction, and for p ≥ b we
have u ≡M so
(λ∗)2p2(1− p)2
2
upp − ru+ λ∗p = −rM + rM = 0.
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Consequently, with Λ∗ fixed, Itoˆ’s formula gives
e−rtu(Pt) = u(p)−
∫ t
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps)Ps ds+
∫ t
0
e−rs
up(Ps)
vp(Ps)
dWˆs,
where we note that the stochastic integral is a martingale. Now fix an FX -stopping τ ∈ T. By
optional sampling,
u(p) = E
[
e−rτ∧tu(Pτ∧t) +
∫ τ∧t
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps)Ps ds
]
= E
[
e−rτ∧tu(Pτ∧t) + θ
∫ τ∧t
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps) ds
]
≤ E
[
e−rτ∧tM + θ
∫ τ∧t
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps) ds
]
,
where the second equality follows using iterated expectations since Pt = E
[
θ| FXt
]
, see Propo-
sition 12. Letting t→∞ gives
u(p) ≤ E
[
e−rτM + θ
∫ τ
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps) ds
]
= J 1(τ,Λ∗; p)
by monotone convergence.
Now consider a randomized stopping time γ ∈ Tr generated by Γ ∈ A, and let γ(c) :=
inf{t ≥ 0 : Γt > c} for c ∈ [0,∞) (so that γ = γ(U)). Then γ(c) ∈ T, and
J 1(γ,Λ∗; p) =
∫ ∞
0
e−cJ 1(γ(c),Λ∗; p) dc ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−cu(p) dc = u(p),
so
u(p) ≤ inf
γ∈Tr
J 1(γ,Λ∗; p).
For the reverse inequality, consider γ = γ∗. Since u
(
Pγ∗(c)
)
= M on the event {γ∗(c) <∞},
we have for c ≥ 0 that
u(p) = E
[
e−rγ
∗(c)∧tu(Pγ∗(c)∧t) +
∫ γ∗(c)∧t
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps)Ps ds
]
≥ E
[
e−rγ
∗(c)M1{γ∗(c)≤t} + θ
∫ γ∗(c)∧t
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps) ds
]
→ E
[
e−rγ
∗(c)M +
∫ γ∗(c)
0
e−rsλ∗(Ps) ds
]
= J 1(γ∗(c),Λ∗; p)
as t→∞ by monotone convergence. Consequently,
J 1(γ∗,Λ∗; p) =
∫ ∞
0
e−cJ 1(γ∗(c),Λ∗; p) dc ≤ u(p),
so
u(p) = J 1(γ∗,Λ∗; p) = inf
γ∈Tr
J 1(γ,Λ∗; p).
Optimality of Λ∗. Let us now fix the stopping strategy γ∗ generated by
Γt =
∫ t
0
β(Ps) ds,
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where {
dXt = −θdΛt + dWt
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(dXt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt).
If the fraudster uses a strategy Λ, the process P satisfies
dPt = −λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)(−dΛt + λ∗(Pt)Pt dt)− λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt) dWt
on the event {θ = 1}. We then want to show that Λ∗ is an optimal response for the fraudster.
More precisely, we want to show
Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ∗; p) := E
[∫ γ∗
0
e−rsdΛs|θ = 1
]
≥ Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ; p)
for any fraud strategy Λ ∈ L.
To do that, first define a process N by
Nt := e
−rtv(Pt)(1−Qt) +
∫ t∧γ∗
0
e−rsdΛs,
where
Qt := 1{t≥γ∗}
is a jump process with intensity β(Pt). Note that
dNt = 1{t≤γ∗}e−rt
(
1
2
(λ∗(Pt))2P 2t (1− Pt)2vpp(Pt)− (λ∗(Pt))2P 2t (1− Pt)vp(Pt)− rv(Pt)
)
dt
+1{t≤γ∗}e−rt (1 + λ∗(Pt)Pt(1− Pt)vp(Pt)) dΛt − e−rtv(Pt) dQt + 1{t≤γ∗}e−rt dWt
= 1{t≤γ∗}e−rtv(Pt)(β(Pt) dt− dQt) + 1{t≤γ∗}e−rt dWt
so N is a lower bounded local martingale. Consequently,
v(p) = N0 ≥ E[Nt] ≥ E
[∫ t∧γ∗
0
e−rsdΛs
]
,
so by monotone convergence we find that v(p) ≥ supΛ Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ; p).
On the other hand, consider the case Λ = Λ∗. Note that Zt := e−rtv(Pt)+
∫ t
0 e
−rsdΛ∗s satisfies
dZt = e
−rtβ(Pt)v(Pt) dt− e−rt dWt
for t < τa := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt ≥ a}. Since βv is bounded, we thus have
Zt ≤ v(p) + C +
∫ t
0
e−rs dWs
for some C > 0, which shows that {Zt, t ≤ τa} is uniformly integrable. Consequently,
Nt := e
−rtv(Pt)(1−Qt) +
∫ t∧γ∗
0
e−rsdΛ∗s
is a martingale, and optional sampling gives
v(p) = E[Nt] = E
[
e−rtv(Pt)1{t<γ∗} +
∫ t∧γ∗
0
e−rsdΛ∗s
]
.
The arguments used in Theorem 13 show that γ∗ < ∞ a.s. Consequently, by uniform integra-
bility,
lim
t→∞E
[
e−rtv(Pt)1{t<γ∗}
]
= 0.
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Therefore, monotone convergence yields
v(p) = E
[∫ γ∗
0
e−rsdΛ∗s
]
= Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ∗; p).
Thus
Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ∗; p) = v(p) ≥ sup
Λ
Jˆ 2(γ∗,Λ; p),
which completes the proof.
Remark 22. As in the case with a pure NE described in Section 3, the specification of λ∗ on
(a, 1) can be done in several ways; we have chosen to use the same formula on (a, 1) as on (b, a).
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